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THE COAL AND LIGNITE LEASE COMPARED 
TO THE OIL AND GAS LEASE
Although oil and gas production has long dominated the state's
natural resources scene, Arkansas, this land of opportunity, has
long yielded other fruits of the earth. Hard minerals, ranging from
the mundane, such as sand and gravel,1 to the exotic, such as dia- 
2
monds,2 have been commercially mined here. More importantly, from
the energy standpoint, there has been significant coal production in
the state since 1870. Lignite, sometimes referred to as brown coal,
3
has reputedly been mined here since the Civil War.
Despite the commercial production of a wide array of hard miner-
als, including significant coal production, most lawyers by experi- 
ence and education are oriented to the law of oil and gas. Oil and 
gas activities overshadowed other mineral transactions in the prac-
tice and legal education catered to the marketplace by teaching min-
eral law almost exclusively by reference to oil and gas. As a con-
sequence, the hard minerals lease was virtually ignored. The result 
has been, absent exposure to hard minerals transactions, a lack of 
familiarity with the hard minerals lease.
Due to the increased demand for energy and the continuous de-
pletion of our oil and gas reserves, the need for alternative energy 
resources has revived the coal industry. Our vast reserves of coal,
particularly in the west, indicate that coal will probably be the
4
primary energy resource of the near future. As a result, the buying 
and selling of coal leases has increased in Arkansas. Of more con-
sequence, however, is the current lease activity in lignite in south-
ern Arkansas. This deposit is part of a broad band of lignite which 
spans Texas, Louisiana, southern Arkansas and Mississippi and is re-
ported to be of a relatively low BTU value and low sulphur content
that must be surface mined.
The increased market activity in coal and lignite and the sheer 
magnitude of the state's lignite deposit accentuates the need for a 
working knowledge of the coal and lignite lease. With this in mind, 
this paper will compare the "classical" coal lease to the "classical" 
oil and gas lease with an emphasis on the basic structure of the 
coal lease: the granting, royalty (including minimum and advance 
royalty), and habendum clauses. The lessee's right of suface usage, 
including the right to strip mine, will be discussed. Additionally, 
relevant clauses of coal and lignite leases in current use will be 
highlighted.
The distinct inherent characteristics of oil and gas and coal 
have resulted in the development of lease forms which are conceptually
8
and functionally different. oil and gas are fugacious substances 
generally found in deep sub-surface resevoirs, making them difficult 
to find and, once found, it is difficult to determine the amount present. 
As a result, the modern oil and gas lease is exploration oriented.
Coal and lignite, in contrast to oil and gas, are stationary hard 
minerals. Since the deposit must be of a substantial size for eco-
nomically feasible mining, the location is generally well known prior 
to development. Further, the amount of mineable coal in place on the 
lessor's tract can frequently be ascertained with some certainty.
Thus, the lessor and lessee can contract with some specificity as 
to the rate of production. The coal lease is, therefore, development 
oriented. In fact, the coal lease, granting the lessee the right to 
develop the mineral for the payment of royalties on production, re-
sembles a sale of the minerals on an installment basis. One coal
producing jurisdiction, Pennsylvania, holds generally that a coal
9
lease results in a sale of the coal in fee simple to the lessee.
5
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Differences in the respective mining practices and mining in-
dustries also result in different lease requirements for coal and 
oil and gas production. After discovery, oil and gas may be quickly 
and easily extracted and transported to a readily accessible and 
continuous market. Coal, however, requires a longer lead time for 
development since the mining equipment frequently must be specially 
designed and then assembled on the premises. Finally, as coal is 
moved by rail, transportation arrangements tend to be difficult and 
time consuming.10
At present, lignite production is complicated by the fact that 
there is no presently established market for the extracted substance 
—  no current commercial use of lignite. Furthermore, the economics 
of rail transportation and the peculiar physical properties of lig-
nite render it infeasible to transport the substance by rail. Cur-
rent indications, therefore, point toward "on site" development and 
use which will require large blocks of committed acreage to render 
the project operational. As lignite must be strip mined, with up to 
150 feet of overburden being removed in some areas, reclamation is 
required. The uncertainties inherent in the development of lignite 
are reflected in lignite leases currently in use.
THE GRANTING CLAUSE
The purpose of the granting clause is to effect a presently 
operative transfer of an estate and to define the nature of the 
interest created. Since ownership of minerals at common law is an 
incident to the ownership of land, coal and other hard minerals are 
owned in place by the landowner.11 However, as oil and gas are 
fugacious minerals subject to being drained by adjacent landowners, 
a few jurisdictions hold that these substances are not owned in place
-3-
but that the landowner has only an "exclusive right to take" - the
exclusive right to capture the underlying oil and gas by operations
on his land. Such a right is an incorporeal hereditament, i.e., a
12
non-possessory interest. Arkansas is usually regarded as an owner-
ship in place jurisdiction in which the landowner has a corporeal
13or possessory interest in the oil and gas underlying his tract.
Therefore, in this state, the general principles of conveyancing
theoretically allow any interest that can be created in land -
corporeal or incorporeal - to be created in the lessee by the approp-
14
riate use of technical words of grant in the oil and gas or hard 
minerals lease.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas, however, has refused to accord 
the language of the granting clause its traditional effect in oil 
and gas and hard minerals leases and has consistently held that the 
lessee of the mineral lease, regardless of the specific mineral in-
volved, has an "interest and easement in the land to explore for
15
and mine" the mineral. This construction was adopted in Osborn v.
16
Arkansas Territorial Oil and Gas Co., in which the court so read 
an oil and gas lease which "granted, demised and let unto the lessee 
all of the oil and gas in and under said land." The effect of this 
construction is to create an incorporeal hereditament, i.e., a non- 
possessory interest, despite the fact that the granting clause con-
tained in the lease would have conveyed the oil and gas in place,
17 18
a possessory interest. In Goodson v. Comet Coal Co., the court,
refusing to examine the language of the granting clause of a coal 
lease in determining the extent of the lessee's interest, emphasized 
the application of this construction by observing that the lease in-
volved was "a lease in the ordinary form and the rule announced by 
the court relative to the ordinary mineral lease in the case of
-4-
present sale or transfer to the title of the coal, but simply a con-
19tract to mine under the land..."
The construction of the granting clause is primarily important
in determining the remedy available to protect the interest of the 
20 lessee. Traditionally, if the granting clause vests the lessee with 
a possessory interest in the minerals, ejectment would lie in the 
event of eviction. If the lease only created a non-possessory interest, 
i.e., an exclusive right to take, ejectment would not lie and the les-
see would be relegated to an equitable remedy. However, difficulty
exists in the application of such traditional theory to mineral 
21
leases. If the lessee has a possessory interest in the minerals 
but operations have not been commenced on the premises, the avail- 
ability of ejectment as a remedy is clouded since the surface owner 
is also entitled to possession and that portion of the surface that 
the lessee is entitled to occupy to mine the minerals has not yet been 
delineated. If the lessee has a non-possessory interest in the miner-
als but has been in prior possession of the premises, i.e., operations 
having been previously commenced, logic would dictate that ejectment 
should lie upon eviction as to that portion of the premises previously
occupied despite the fact the lessee's interest is "non-possessory."
22
In Henry v. Gulf Refining Co., the Arkansas Supreme Court, 
consistent with its previous holdings on the effect of the granting 
clause, held that ejectment would lie even though the lessee's inter-
est under the lease was "an exclusive right to take", a non-possessory 
interest. The court further intimated that ejectment would be avail-
able as a remedy irrespective of whether a prior entry had been made
23
on the premises.
Osborn v. Arkansas Territorial Oil and Gas Co., the lease is not a
-5-
Therefore, regardless of whether the mineral is oil and gas 
or lignite and irrespective of the language contained in the grant- 
ing clause, the court seems predisposed to find that the lease creates 
in the lessee an exclusive easement to explore for and mine the 
mineral which despite being a non-possessory interest will support 
an action in ejectment. The failure to accord the traditional ef-
fect to the language of the granting clause, and to follow the tra-
ditional consequences as to the effect of that clause on the avail- 
ability of the remedy, has resulted in a uniformity as to the les-
see's interest in the minerals and a simplification as to the nature 
and effect of the lessor-lessee relationship in a mineral lease in 
Arkansas.
ROYALTY CLAUSE
The royalty clause in a mineral lease provides for the "bene-
fits to inure to the lessor as a result of the extraction of the de-
24
sired valuable substances." The relatively standard uniform royal-
ty share that characterizes the oil and gas lease (1/8 of production 
free and clear of all costs) is not a trait of the coal or hard min-
erals lease. Different methods of computing the lessor's royalty 
share exist in the coal industry and it is not unusual to find royal-
ty clauses utilizing different methods of computation in leases with-
25
in the same field. Furthermore, regardless of the method of com-
putation, the lessor's royalty share is not necessarily uniform since 
royalty in the coal lease, unlike the oil and gas lease, is more apt 
to be negotiated.
One method of computation in use in the hard minerals lease
provides that the lessor is to receive as royalty a straight monetary
26
sum for each ton or acre foot of coal mined. This method of com-
- 6..
putation, by fixing the lessor's return for a designated quantity of 
coal, insulates the lessor from the effects of a decline in the mar-
ket price but also forcloses him from participating in future mar- 
27
ket increases. In an age of habitual inflation, such a royalty 
clause is obviously not advantageous to the lessor.
An alternative method of computation is that of basing the les-
sor's royalty share on a specified percentage of the market value of 
the mined or marketable coal. This method ensures that the lessor 
will also realize the benefits from future increases in the market 
price, but it could result in a royalty which may not reflect the 
long range value of a depletable natural resource should distressed 
market conditions occur.
The present trend in royalty clauses for hard mineral leases, 
and the approach which appears to be in predominant use in coal and 
lignite leases in Arkansas, bases the lessor's royalty share on a 
combination of the above computations: the lessor receives a speci-
fied percentage of the market value of the mined substance, but that 
sum shall not amount to less than a certain specified sum per quant- 
ity removed. This basis of computation allows the lessor to real-
ize the benefits of future price increases while placing a minimum 
price floor on the amount of royalty which may be paid for the mined 
coal.
MINIMUM OR ADVANCE ROYALTY
Minimum or Advance Royalty is a distinctive trait of the coal 
30
lease. Advance royalty may simply take the form of a specific sum
that the lessee is obligated to pay in advance of securing produc-
31
tion. Likewise, minimum royalty may refer to the obligation of 
the lessee to make a designated payment in the event that a specified
-7-
amount of coal is not mined. However, the terms are frequently
32
used interchangeably to refer to one of the following specific con- 
tractual obligations which the lessee undertakes: 1) to pay a fixed 
sum to the lessor designated as royalty regardless of whether or not 
any coal is mined; or 2) to pay such a sum if the amount mined is
insufficient either to meet a specified tonnage requirement or to
33
generate royalty payments equal to a designated sum.
The extent of the- obligation of the lessee to pay minimum or ad-
vance royalties depends upon the terms of the lease. The lessor will
normally have a right to accrued but unpaid minimum or advance royal- 
34
ty payments. However, one lessee who was "to mine...all merchant-
able... coal that can be profitably stripmine[d]" was relieved by the 
court from the obligation to make minimum royalty payments upon the 
exhaustion of all "merchantable coal" even though the provisions gov-
35
erning such payments failed to explicitly provide for this contingency. 
Moreover, coal leases uniformly contain a clause which relieves the 
lessee from advance or minimum payments when the production of coal is 
precluded by circumstances beyond the lessee's control. Such exclu-
sionary provisions generally encompass a wide variety of causes for
non-performance, such as acts of God, strikes, car shortages, fire,
36
etc. Although such clauses are purportedly construed according to
the intent of the parties, they are generally strictly construed
37
against the lessee. If such a specific provision is not included
in the lease, the lessee's obligations to pay advance or minimum
royalties will not be relieved due to circumstances beyond his con-
38
trol which prevent production from the mine.
IMPLIED COVENANT TO DEVELOP AND MINIMUM 
AND ADVANCE ROYALTY PAYMENTS
The lessee's obligation to make minimum or advance royalty pay-
- 8  -
ments has been said to "provide a rather expensive inducement for
a lessee to commence production of ore or to relinquish the free- 
39
hold." The accuracy of this observation obviously relates to the 
size of the payment that the lessee is obligated to make. However, 
there is a relationship, other than this inherent economic induce-
ment, between the minimum or advance royalty payments and the lessee's 
obligation to develop the property.
In Arkansas, a covenant on behalf of the lessee to explore and
develop is implied in a mining lease. The landmark case is Mans-
4 0
field Gas Co. v. Alexander, in which the Supreme Court was faced 
with a fifty year fixed term lease, on a royalty share basis, which 
granted to the lessee the exclusive right to prospect for and mine 
"lead, zinc, coal, gas, oil and other minerals." The lessee had 
failed to explore the property for minerals. The court held that 
the land was subject to an implied covenant to explore. Noting that 
the consideration that the lessor was to receive was not the recited 
"$1.00 consideration" but the "royalties on the minerals", the 
Court stated:
"the law implies a covenant upon the part of the lessee 
to make exploration and search for the minerals in a 
proper manner and with reasonable diligence and to work 
the mine or well when the mineral is discovered, so 
that the lessor may obtain the compensation which both 
parties must have had in contemplation when the agree-
ment was entered into. "41
While Mansfield is generally viewed as a cornerstone of the law 
  _ 42
of oil ana gas, the Arkansas Supreme Court has consistently implied
a covenant to develop in hard mineral leases covering a wide range
of substances from diamonds to sand, gravel and coal.43 In Morley 
44 
v. Berg, a case involving gravel, the court observed that "the 
duty of complete development is inherent in all mining leases that 
provide a royalty to the lessor."
-9-
The implied covenant to develop requires the lessee to commence
45
exploration or development with "reasonable diligence", a notion 
which depends on the facts of each case, having regard to various 
relevant factors including the size and accessibility of the prop- 
erty, the usual method of development in similar situations and the
 46
expenses involved. Once development has been commenced, the lessee
47
is obligated to continue production with reasonable diligence. If
the implied covenant to develop is breached, the lessor may seek
48 49
cancellation based on a forfeiture of the lease or damages.
Naturally, in order to permit flexibility in his mining opera-
tions, the lessee may desire control over development independent of 
the obligations implied by law. Lease provisions which require that
advance or minimum royalty payments be made to the lessor provide
50the mechanism by which the lessee may exercise such control. Mini-
mum and advance royalty payments satisfy the lessee's implied cove-
nant to develop and permit the lessee to indefinitely delay or even
51
to forsake development. In essence, the minimum or advance royal-
ty payments clause in the hard minerals lease discharges the les-
see's implied obligation to explore and develop just as the delay 
rental clause in the oil and gas lease discharges the lessee's im-
plied obligation to drill an exploratory well. Therefore, minimum
or advance royalty payments should properly be regarded as a substi-
52
tute for production.
The lessee's satisfaction of the implied covenant to develop by 
paying minimum or advance royalties has been based on different 
theories. One such theory is that as such payments constitute con-
sideration to the lessor for the lessee's privilege to defer develop- 
53ment, the inclusion of minimum or advance royalty provisions clearly 
indicate that the parties did not contemplate continuous development;
- 1o -
the lessor, therefore, cannot complain for lack of development.
As this theoretical basis obviously emphasizes the intent of the par-
ties, it is tantamount to holding that since the parties have expres-
sly agreed on the matter of development, no room to imply a covenant 
exists. Other courts, however, have labeled minimum or advance
royalty payments as enforceable liquidated damages, a sum agreed
upon in advance by the parties as the damages which will accrue to 
the lessor on breach by the lessee of the implied covenant to develop.
As the purpose of the minimum or advance royalty provision in 
the hard minerals lease somewhat parallels that of the delay rental 
clause in the oil and gas lease, it is not surprising to find that 
that provision satisfies the implied covenant to develop on the same 
legal basis as the delay rental clause discharges the lessee's im-
plied obligation to drill an exploratory well. The delay rental pay-
ment is also viewed as consideration paid to the lessor for the les- 
see's privilege to defer exploration. Therefore, as the parties
have defined the extent of the lessee's obligation as to develop-
56
ment, no room for implication exists. Furthermore, a minority
view apparently exists which also categorizes delay rental payments
57
as enforceable liquidated damages.
In Arkansas, the cases suggest that the advance and minimum royal-
ty of the hard minerals lease and the delay rental clause of the oil
and gas lease operate on the same legal theory to satisfy their re-
5 8
spective implied covenants. In Inman v. Milwhite, an Eight Circuit 
Court of Appeals decision applying Arkansas law, the lessor sought 
cancellation of a soapstone mining lease, inter alia, for breach of 
the implied covenant to develop. The lease contained a provision 
allowing payment of minimum royalties "in lieu of all development 
operations” for the year in which payment was tendered. The lessee
54
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had not diligently mined the property but had tendered minimum royal-
ty payments as provided by the lease. The court rejected the lessor's 
claim of a breach of the implied covenant: "where, as here, however, 
the contracting parties have specifically dealt with the question of
development and operations their agreement governs and there can be
59
no room for implication."
In certain instances, however, payments labeled as advance or
minimum royalties and paid to the lessor may not satisfy the lessee's
implied covenant to develop. For example, a lump sum payment made
to the lessor at the execution of the lease, even if denominated as
a bonus or advance royalty, may not negative the lessee's implied
6 0
covenant to develop. In Taylor v. Kingman Feldspar, an Arizona
case involving a feldspar lease, the lessee initially paid $3800 to
the lessor as advance royalty which could also be credited against
future royalties. The court held that notwithstanding the payment
being labeled as an "advance royalty", the lessee's failure to develop
resulted in a forfeiture of the lease as "a lease [in] which [the]
...main consideration moving to the lessor is to be... royalty...im-
61
poses upon the lessee the duty to develop.
This principle is also applicable to the implied covenant to
explore in the oil and gas lease, as recognized in Arkansas in Ezell
62
v. Oil Associates, Inc. There, the lessor brought suit for can-
cellation for breach of the implied covenant to explore despite the 
fact that he had received a bonus of 3000 shares in common stock of an 
operating oil company controlled by the defendant lessee. Neverthe-
less, the court held that the lease was subject to an implied cove-
nant to explore. As to the effect of the bonus, the court noted 
that "the principal consideration for the lease was the payment to 
the lessors of a part of the oil and gas produced on the leased
-12 -
premises."
Both Taylor v. Kingman Feldspar and Ezell v. Oil Associates, Inc
follow traditional theory that the principal consideration moving to
the lessor is the royalties accruing from the extraction of the min- 
63
rals. The bonus or other designated lump sum payment merely rep-
64
resents the consideration for executing the lease. Such a payment,
regardless of the size, is not to be considered as a representation
by the lessor that exploration or development may be deferred. The
argument has been made, however, that advance royalty in the coal
and lignite lease should be distinguished from the bonus in the oil
and gas lease and treated as "true royalty" due to the obvious intent
65
of the parties.
On the reasoning reflected in Taylor v. Kingman Feldspar, it
has been argued that advance or minimum royalty payments credited
against future royalties accruing on actual production should not
6 6 
negative the existence of the implied development covenant. If 
such payments are not credited or are only partially credited, the 
sum not so credited clearly constitutes consideration paid to the 
lessor for the privilege to defer mining operations. Such a pay-
ment is obviously in the nature of delay rentals. If the sum paid 
is to be applied against future royalties, arguably no consideration 
is being paid for that privilege. However, the receipt of payments 
that represent royalties in advance of production is a benefit to 
which the lessee is not otherwise entitled and should, therefore, 
constitute the required consideration for the lessee's privilege to 
defer production.
Furthermore, some jurisdictions hold that nominal minimum or 
advance royalty payments in a hard minerals lease do not satisfy the 
lessee's implied covenant to develop and the lease, absent develop-
-13-
merit, is subject to forfeiture. An illustrative case is Dulin v.
6 7
West, a Colorado decision in which the lessee secured from the 
lessor a 20 year lease to mine peat moss. The lease provided for 
both monthly royalty and an annual rental payment of $10.00. The 
lessee attempted to hold the lease by making annual rental payments 
but the lessor sought cancellation due to the breach of the implied 
covenant to develop. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the de-
fendant's argument that the annual rental payment negated the exist-
ence of the implied covenant to develop:
When minimum royalties and annual rentals provided for 
in a lease are reasonably substantial in relation to 
the anticipated return from the property, they are in 
effect an agreed compensation to the lessor for the les-
see's failure to achieve reasonable production. --
The rule is otherwise, however, where the minimum an-
nual rental is miniscule in relation to reasonably con-
templated profits from the operation.68
The other jurisdictions which follow the Dulin holding are 
  
Indiana,69 Kentucky70 and Wyoming71. To put the Dulin line of cases 
in their proper perspective, it must be noted that each of these
72
jurisdictions, except possibly Wyoming, follow the old Indiana rule 
which held that payment of a nominal sum as delay rentals did not 
satisfy the oil and gas lessee's implied obligation to drill an ex-
ploratory well. The basis of the Indiana rule, by implication, is 
that the lessee should not thereby be permitted to tie-up the prop-
erty and speculate on its fluctuating values when actual exploration 
and development of the property is the contemplated result of the
lessor-lessee relationship. Arkansas clearly rejected the Indiana
73
rule in Lawrence v. Mahoney and the concept that a nominal sum de-
lay rental payment will satisfy the oil and gas lessee's implied 
covenant to explore is firmly entrenched here.
If the Dulin line of authority does not merely reflect a minor- 
ity view as to the efficacy of a nominal sum payment on the implied
covenants to explore or develop in a mineral lease, these cases may 
have potential significance in Arkansas in that some coal and lig- 
nite leases have provided advance or minimum royalty of $1.00 per 
acre. Arguably, the issue is rendered moot by the inclusion of a 
clause in such leases that expressly provide that no express or
74
implied covenant to develop is contained in the lease. Following
traditional legal theory as to implied covenants, when the parties
have specifically contracted as to the subject of development, no
75
room exists to imply such an obligation on behalf of the lessee,
If a distinction exists between the hard mineral and the oil 
and gas lease that results in a nominal sum payment failing to satis-
fy the former lessee's implied covenant to develop, even though 
such a payment will discharge the latter lease's implied covenant to 
explore, it is that as to the oil and gas lease: the mineral, the 
subject matter of the lease, is not known to exist on the leased 
premises.76 This fact can only be determined by the drilling of an 
exploratory well: an expensive and, as oil and gas may not be 
found in paying quantities, risky undertaking. If the exploratory 
well results in a dry hole, the lessee suffers a total loss of his 
substantial investment. The risk inherent in discharging the implied 
covenant to explore by drilling is a basis for the holding that if
the parties to the lease so provide, that obligation may be satis-
77
fied by the payment of a nominal sum.
Furthermore, augmenting the holding that nominal sum payment
should discharge the implied covenant to explore is the fact that
the drilling of a well reveals, to a certain extent, the potential
78
of tracts near its proximity to produce oil and gas. Evidence of 
this phenomena is the common practice of block leasing, i.e., the 
leasing of several tracts to secure a block of leased acreage to
-15-
ensure the right to fully develop any possible producing formation 
discovered by the planned exploratory well. If an unsuccessful ex- 
ploratory well is drilled on an adjacent tract, the lessee, if his 
lease so provides, should be permitted to discharge the implied 
covenant to explore by payment of a nominal sum. To require the 
lessee, on pain of forfeiture, to drill what is likely to result in 
another dry hole, would only encourage economic waste and increase 
the cost of oil and gas production.
If the risk inherent in oil and gas exploration is the basis 
for permitting a nominal sum payment to discharge the implied dril-
ling obligation, should not the lessee of the lignite lease be ac-
corded the same privilege as to the implied development covenant?
After all, lignite does not as of yet have an established market.
Even if such a market develops, it may be limited to on-site utili-
zation which could mean that the availability of sufficient com-
mitted acreage near the leased premises to render such a project 
operational would ultimately determine if the lignite underlying the 
tract is to be mined. The lignite lease would appear to be as 
fraught with risk for the lessee as is the oil and gas lease.
Since advance or minimum royalty payments in the hard mineral lease
serve a similar purpose and operate via the same legal theory as does
the delay rental payment in the oil and gas lease, the clause in the
hard minerals lease may be drafted to function the same as the delay
79
rental payment in the drilling clause of the oil and gas lease, 
i.e., to operate in lieu of development either as a "special limi-
tation" in which the failure to timely pay the designated sum results 
in the "premature" termination of the lease or as breach of a "cov-
enant" to pay the designated sum for which the lessee incurs liability. 
Although historically the development oriented hard minerals lease
-16-
did not pattern the advance or minimum royalty clause after the
unique drilling clause of the exploration oriented oil and gas lease,
current coal and lignite lease forms in Arkansas have been drafted
80
to conform to the operation of the drilling clause. This develop-
ment indicates that some prospective producers of lignite demand the 
ability to prematurely terminate the lease and thus avoid advance 
royalty payments.
HABENDUM CLAUSE
The basic function of the habendum clause is to define and limit 
the duration of the lessee's estate. Although the habendum clause 
serves the same purpose in both oil and gas and hard minerals leases,
81
the two leases have historically utilized different habendum clauses 
as the result of the basic distinctions between the two leases and 
the respective industry mining practices. The standard form haben-
dum clause in the oil and gas lease provides for a short primary 
term of five to ten years with a secondary term of "so long as oil
and gas is produced." The oil and gas lease is therefore capable of
82
being of indefinite duration. This type of habendum clause is 
required since the probable life of the well is virtually unpredict-
able and the lessee who hazards the risk of exploration wants to 
realize the full benefit of his investment. In contrast, the haben-
dum clause in the coal lease was usually of fixed duration but in 
modern times it has provided for an extension for an additional fixed 
period. Since the probable life of the mineral deposit can frequent-
ly be ascertained, the lessee will seek a lease of sufficient dura-
tion to permit, the opening and full development of the mine with ad-
ditional time to secure a market and to arrange for necessary trans-
-17-
portation. The lessor, however, wants the duration of the lease 
limited in order to secure a rate of production which will ensure 
a profitable return from the royalties. The habendum clause in the 
coal lease is, therefore, more likely to be the result of negotiation 
between the parties.
The habendum clause of the modern oil and gas lease is a pro-
duct of evolution --  predecessor lease forms contained habendum
clauses which provided for straight long primary term and "no term"
83
leases. Although the modern habendum clause of the coal lease 
is also a product of evolution, the coal lease, unlike the oil and 
gas lease, has not evolved a relatively standardized uniform haben-
dum clause.
The "No Term" Lease
Although rarely used now, early coal leases sometimes did not
specify any term. The habendum clause indicated that the duration
of the lease would be "until all workable and merchantable coal
84
shall have been mined." In the early days of the oil and gas in-
dustry, "no term" leases were used which also characteristically
provided for an indefinite number of extensions by payment of annual 
85
delay rentals. The purpose of the "no term" oil and gas lease was 
to permit the lessee to extend the period of exploration indefi-
nitely for as long as the lessee was willing to speculate with the 
leasehold. For this reason, the courts treated no term leases 
harshly and generally held that such leases were either invalid due 
to lack of consideration, terminable by the will of the lessor, or
valid but subject to an implied covenant to drill an exploratory
86
well on pain of forfeiture. However, if the coal lease is truly
-18-
a development lease and subject to an implied or express covenant
to reasonably and diligently develop, there is no reason to question
87
the validity of the "no term" coal lease.
The Definite Term Lease
The habendum clause of the definite term lease merely provides
that the lease will exist tor a definite specified duration —- most
88
commonly 20 years. Absent abandonment or the exercise of an express 
surrender clause, duration of the lease is for the specified period.
The definite term clause lease is rarely, used today due to its fail- 
ure to protect the interests of the lessee. If the specified term 
was too short, the lessee ran the risk of premature termination. The 
lease would end prior to exhaustion of all mineable coal and the 
lessee either lost the full benefit of his investment or faced the
89
unenviable prospect of having to negotiate an extension of the lease.
More obnoxious to the lessee was the fixed long term lease in which
the lessee found himself obligated to pay minimum royalty even after
90
the commercial coal had been exhausted. Finally, the lessor found 
the fixed long term lease providing for low minimum royalties unde-
sirable as the lessee had no obligation to mine and the property was 
tied up for an extended period of time for a low monetary return.
A modification of the definite term clause is the long fixed
term lease that provides for an earlier termination when all "mer-
91
chantable and mineable coal" has been mined. The problem presented 
by the use of this type of habendum clause arises upon termination 
of the lease when all mineable coal has not been mined. That portion 
of the coal not mined cannot, thereafter, be recoverable since ex- 
traction equipment cannot be economically installed to remove only 
a small amount of coal. The lessor, therefore, could be deprived of
the full development of this natural resource. Merchantable coal 
has been construed as being coal of a quality that is "salable" on
the market.
92
"Mineable coal" has been construed as being coal so
situated that it can be mined at a reasonable profit to the lessee.
The lessor has been required to shoulder the burden of proof as to
94
the continued existence of "merchantable and mineable" coal.
93
Definite Term with Renewal or Extension Periods
The most widely used lease form, and the modern trend, provides
for a relatively short definite term (analogous to the primary term
in the oil and gas lease) with a provision for renewal or extension
95 
for an additional fixed period of time. The right to extend the
lease at the end of the primary term fully protects the interest of
the lessee. Frequently, coal leases require that the lessee give
written notice of the decision to renew the lease within a specified
96
period of time prior to the end of the primary term. The notice 
requirement provisions have been held to operate as a condition prec- 
edent to the renewal of the lease and time, therefore, is of the es- 
97
sence. Other leases have provided a self-executing clause that ex-
9 8
tends the lease "so long as" the mineral is being mined.
Oil and Gas Habendum Clause
In recent years, habendum clauses in hard mineral leases fash-
ioned after the oil and gas lease have appeared in reported decis- 
99 
ions. Such leases typically provide for a primary term and the 
typical oil. and gas lease secondary term adapted to hard minerals, "as 
long as the leased premises are being mined or ore is being produced." 
In fact, current coal and lignite leases in use in southern Arkansas 
are characterized by an extended primary term and "as long as coal 
is produced in paying quantities". In Inman v. Milwhite.100 the 
lease contained a habendum clause that provided in part "as long
-20-
as paying quantity production of soapstone ... is continued." The
lessor argued, inter alia, that the lease should be cancelled as it
was not producing in paying quantities. In deciding this question,
the court reasoned that, since the solid mineral lease resembled oil
and gas leases, the definition of paying quantities relevant to
the oil and gas lease would be applicable. The court then applied
101
the Clifton v. Koontz prudent operator standard to determine if 
production in paying quantities existed. Milwhite clearly indicates 
that the habendum clause of the oil and gas lease is adaptable to 
the coal lease and that the courts will give the same effect to the 
language regardless of the mineral involved.
SURFACE USUAGE, SUBJACENT AND LATERAL 
SUPPORT AND STRIP MINING
Frequently, the mineral estate is described as the dominant
estate and the surface estate as the servient estate. More accurate,
however, is the statement that the mineral estate and the surface
estate are each "mutually" dominant and "mutually" servient. The
mineral estate is dominant and the surface estate is servient in
the sense that the mineral estate has the right to such use of the
surface estate as is reasonably necessary for exploration and the
102
extraction of the mineral. This right is implied from the grant
severing the minerals from the surface in order to permit the mineral
103
owner or lessee to enjoy the interest conveyed. However, the sur-
face estate is the dominant estate and the mineral estate is the
servient estate in the sense that the servient estate is entitled
104
to subjacent and lateral support from the mineral estate. This
right of the surface owner does not rest upon a grant, express or
implied, but is a proprietary right, sometimes referred to as a third
-21-
estate in the land, which may be held or conveyed separately and
106
distinctly from either the surface or the minerals.
107
The Arkansas Supreme Court in Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Goode, in
describing the rights of the mineral owner, indicated that reasonably
necessary use of the surface for exploration encompasses an easement
of ingress and egress to prospect for and remove the substance, the
right to erect all necessary applicances for removal, and the right to
occupy as much of the surface as is reasonably necessary for mining 
108
purposes. The mineral owner or lessee, as the owner of the domi-
nant estate, must enjoy his right to the use of the surface with due
regard to the interests of the owner of the surface estate, i.e.,
109
the servient estate. Excessive or unreasonable use of the surface
105
by the lessee will result in liability.
110
Negligent operations re-
sulting in surface damages has also been the basis of liability for
111
the mineral owner or the lessee.
Oil and gas operations in modern times have generally been marked
by a lack of substantial interference with the surface of the proper- 
112
ty. Recent petroleum exploration and production usually require
surface space only for a well site, battery tanks, settling tanks and
sub-surface gathering lines. Thus, the oil and gas lessee and the
surface owner have been able to co-exist with each enjoying their
113
respective property interests.
Instead of relying on the right by implication of reasonably
necessary surface usage, the typical oil and gas lease provides for
various easements in the surface which expressly delineates the op-
114
erations which the lessee may conduct on the leased premises. A
representative sample of lease included easements are the right to 
lay pipelines, construct roads and dams, install tanks, erect power




contain a surface damage clause which obligates the lessee to com-
pensate the surface owner for certain specified injuries to the 
116
premises.
Deep or drift mining, which basically involves "underground" 
mining is the traditional method of mining coal. Deep mining in-
volves the sinking of a vertical shaft into the subsurface and the 
developing of underground tunnels and passageways from which the coal
is withdrawn and removed through the shaft.
117
Deep mining further
utilizes portions of the surface for tramways, tipples and other
118
structures necessary to process and transport the mined coal.
Deep mining leaves the surface substantially usable by the owner of 
119
the surface.
The coal lease has followed the practice of providing express
easements which define the extent of the operations that the lessee
120 
is entitled to engage in on the leased premises. The provisions
for express easements generally grants the lessee the right of
ingress and egress upon and through the surface and subsurface with
additional easements for construction and maintenance of transporta-
121
tion and development facilities. The coal lease frequently pro-
122
vides that the lessee may deposit debris on the property.
The bane of deep mining coal operations is the subsidence of the 
surface due to the removal of the underlying strata which results 
in the liability of the lessee for failure to provide subjacent and 
lateral support to the surface. Subjacent support is the right of
the surface owner to have the land supported by underlying strata. 123
Lateral support is the right to have the surface supported by adjoin- 
124
ing land. Subsidence of the surface due to coal mining operations
has been a problem in Arkansas.
125
In Western Coal Mining Co. v. Young, the lessee had operated
-23-
a mine 180 feet below the surface and had originally left pillars 
of coal throughout the mine to support the surface. However, the 
lessee later mined the pillars which resulted in the surface sub-
siding and the surface owner's water well being drained. The Ar-
kansas Supreme Court, in affirming a verdict for the surface owner, 
rejected the defendant lessee's argument that it had the right to 
remove the coal without regard to the damage that occurred to the 
surface by reasoning that "if the land is owned by one person and 
the minerals by another, the owner of the minerals cannot remove
them without leaving natural or artificial support to sustain the 
126
surface." The court further noted that the surface owner's right
to subjacent support is absolute and his cause of action for damages
resulting from subsidence is not predicated on establishing negli-
127
gence on behalf of the lessee. In Paris Purity Coal Co. v. Pen-
128
dergrass, a subsequent lateral support case, the court pointed 
out that as to lateral support, the surface owner's right is abso-
lute as to the land in its natural condition; but, as to buildings 
or other improvements, the lessee will not be liable for damages 
resulting from failure to provide adequate support in the absence of 
negligence. This distinguishes lateral support from subjacent sup-
port since as to the latter the lessee is absolutely liable not only
as to the soil in its natural condition but also as to the buildings
129
or other improvements. The court stated that the right to sub-
jacent and lateral support can be expressly waived by apt language
130
in the grant which severs the minerals from the surface. Also, it
131
is generally recognized that waiver can be accomplished by contract.
A different method of mining coal and lignite is open cut, or 
strip, mining. This process involves the tearing away of the earth 
surface and the horizontal extraction of the mineral. As the over-
-24-
burden and the mineral deposit is totally removed, the surface is 
completely destroyed. Strip mining is not a recent technological 
development since coal has apparently been strip mined in some parts
of the U.S. since the turn of the century.
132
However, with the
development of power shovels and modern stripping equipment, open
133
cut mining is the most economical method of removing the coal
where it is not precluded by the depth of the deposit. More import- 
antly, as to shallow deposits of coal and lignite which are located 
so close to the surface that insufficient overburden exists to per-
mit deep mining, strip mining is the only method to extract the min-
eral.
Since strip or open cut mining destroys the surface, a question 
arises as to whether the mineral owner or lignite owner has the right 
to mine the coal and lignite? If so, what is the basis for the right 
of the lessee to destroy the surface by extracting the mineral? Is 
the right to strip mine derived from the reasonably necessary use 
of the surface estate implied in the grant to the mineral owner, or 
is the right implied in law on the ground that the mineral estate is 
inactuality a truly dominant estate with an incident of its owner-
ship being the right to destroy the surface estate? The obvious 
argument for the mineral estate to be treated as such a dominant
estate is that without this dominant right the mineral estate may be
134 135worthless. However, the rule is clearly established that the
lessee or mineral owner does not have the right, either implied by
136
law or implied from the grant, to so destroy the surface. The ma-
jority view is based on the fact that the right implied by grant to 
reasonably and necessary use of the surface by the mineral owner does 
not permit strip mining as the right to "use" does not include the
right to "destroy"
137
Furthermore, the concept of a truly dominant
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mineral estate which permits the mineral holder to strip mine, which
would be a recognized paramount interest in the real property, simply
does not exist or has failed to materialize due to the perception of
the courts that the right to destroy the surface should be resolved
on the intent of the parties at the time of the severance of the min-
138
erals from the surface. Apparently, California is the only juris-
diction that has held that the right to destroy the surface by strip
139
mining is an incident of the onwership of the minerals.
As the right to strip mine is not implied in the grant or by law, 
the lessee will only have the right to utilize open cut mining if the 
lease expressly provides for that method of extraction and the coal 
and lignite has not been previously severed from the surface. How-
ever, if the rights to the coal and lignite have previously been 
severed from the surface rights, the lessee may only acquire the 
right to strip mine from the lessor if the deed of severance reflects 
the intent of the parties that the mineral owner could strip mine or 
extract the mineral by destroying the surface.
The principal case in Arkansas relating to strip mining is Ben-
140
ton v. U.S. Manganese Corp. The owner of the united surface and
mineral estate granted by deed to the mineral owner's predecessor in 
title the "right to mine, excavate, and prospect for minerals and  
ore." The grant further provided that the owner of the surface estate 
would hold the owner of the mineral estate harmless "from liability 
on account of accident or death to stock of any kind, which might 
be injured by falling into pits, excavations, etc., on said lands 
made by grantees or its assigns in mining and prospecting on said 
property, ..." Thereafter, the surface rights were conveyed to the 
present surface owner. The mineral owner then started to extract 
the manganese by strip mining as that was the only method by which
the mineral could be mined. Initially, the surface owner was to con- 
duct and manage the strip mining operations for the mineral owner 
for a certain sum per ton of the extracted manganese. The amount re-
ceived by the surface owner was deemed sufficient by him to justify 
the destruction of the surface. However, the mineral owner later 
dispensed with the surface owner's services and made other arrange-
ments for the strip mining operations. Afterwards, predictably, the 
surface owner attempted to prevent the mineral owner and his employ-
ees from entering upon the premises to strip mine. When the mineral 
owner sought an injunction to prevent the surface owner from inter-
fering with the mining operations, the surface owner defended the 
action on the basis that the complete destruction of the estate by 
strip mining constituted an illegal invasion of the surface estate.
The trial court granted the injunction and the surface owner appealed.
In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the supreme court 
examined the language of the deed which severed the minerals from the 
surface to determine if the intent of the parties was that the miner-
al owner should have the right to strip mine. The court, obviously 
influenced by direct reference to "pits, excavations, etc." held 
that the "opening of pits was contemplated by the conveyance of the 
minerals and the owner of the surface estate took with notice of such
„141conveyance.
The court in Benton followed the general rule of construction 
in determining if the intent of the parties to the severance deed 
was that the mineral owner could destroy the surface in extracting 
the mineral. The court determined the existence of the requisite 
intent by looking to the language of the instrument. In Benton the 
severance deed clearly reflected the intent of the parties. If, how-
ever, the severance instrument is amoiguous, resort to extrinsic
-27-
evidence to determine the intent of the parties is required. In
142
Phipps v. Leftwicn, the Virginia court utilized a method of con-
143
struction which may have potential significance for Arkansas.
There, the court resolved the ambiguity by looking to the "common
practices" —  the practices and methods of mining that were used in
the area at the time of the grant. If strip mining was a known
method of recovery used in the area at the time of the execution of
the deed, that: method of extraction would be permitted unless it
were specifically excluded by that grant. The "common practices"
approach has also been used by other courts as evidence of the intent
144
of the parties. Other extrinsic evidence which has been consid-
ered by courts as part of the circumstances surrounding the execu-
tion of the severance instrument and bearing on the intent of the
parties includes: whether the price paid for the minerals equaled
145
or exceeded the actual value of the land; the physical character
146
of the land, i.e., whether the land was improved agricultural 
land or uninhabited mountainous land; the present existence of recla-
mation statutes which provide for a scheme of restoration for strip 
147
mined land; and the waiver either of the right to subjacent sup-
port or the right to surface damages by the grantor of the severance 
148
deed. Both a constructional preference against the intention to
149
strip mine and the practice of construing the ambiguous deed more
150 
strongly against the grantor have been adopted by some courts.
Even if it has been established that the parties to the deed of 
severance contemplated that the mineral owner can strip mine, there 
is a question remaining as to whether the surface owner has to be 
compensated for the destruction of the surface estate. The Kentucky 
Supreme Court in Buchanan v. Watson held that a mineral owner 
holding under a "broad form" mineral deed, which provided that the
-28-
grantee could use the surface "in any and every manner that may be
152
deemed necessary or convenient for mining" with a complete waiver 
of surface damages, could strip mine the land and destroy the sur-
face without compensating the surface owner except for "oppressive, 
arbitrary, wanton or malicious" exercise of that right. The basis 
for the holding was that the all inclusiveness of the grant with the 
waiver of surface damages indicated that the parties intended the
"estate reserved by the grantor to be subservient to the dominant
153
estate of the grantee." Later, Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining
154
Co., which affirmed the holding in Buchanan, addressed the argu-
ment that the landowner must have contemplated that the surface would 
retain its value for agricultural or residential use or they would 
have deeded the whole title to the mineral owners. The court merely
noted that the landowner "chose to retain the bare title simply for
155
what little value, if any, it might have."
The Arkansas court in Benton rejected Buchanan and the approach 
of the Kentucky court and held that if the mineral owner exercises 
his right to destroy the surface by strip mining, the surface owner 
must be compensated. After making the following observation in Ben-
ton :
...the digging of the pits results in the complete 
destruction of the surface, and the removal of the 
surface to washing plants leaves the surface owner 
with nothing but a "hole in the ground" for agricul-
tural pursuits.156
The court then reasoned that "to deprive ... the owners of the sur-
face estate -—  of any right for damages for the complete destruction
of the surface would be to make the conveyance of the surface as a 
157
mere nullity." The court indicated that this holding was compel-
158
led by Western Coal & Mining Co. v. Young, which held the lessee 
liable for failure to provide subjacent support. Although the court
-29-
did not specifically indicate why the duty to provide subjacent sup-
port necessitates the holding that the mineral holder must compensate 
the surface owner when the right, acquired by grant, to strip mine 
is exercised, the West Virginia Supreme Court in W.Va. Pitts. Coal 
Co. v. Strong, indicated the reason:
Certainly, if the owner of the surface has a pro-
prietary right to subjacent support, he has at least 
an equal right to hold intact the thing to be sup-
ported, i.e., the surface.160
Even though the Arkansas Court in Benton held that the holder 
of the mineral estate has to pay for the destruction of the land by 
strip mining, it remains to be seen whether the court will liberally 
construe such general language as "all the minerals in under or upon" 
with right of "egress to remove the same," which is endemic to earlier 
mineral grants, as granting to the mineral holder the right to strip 
mine the property. This issue must be resolved to determine if the 
mineral estate is truly dominant.
CONCLUSION
Although the hard minerals lease is typically unknown to the 
practioner and lacks the developed case law that accompanies the oil 
and gas lease, it should not be viewed as an enigma. Even though 
differences exist as to the royalty clause and, in older leases, as 
to the habendum clause, the major difference in the basic structure 
of the respective leases is the minimum or advance royalty clause 
which merely serves the same purpose as to development in the hard 
minerals lease as the drilling clause serves as to exploration in 
the oil and gas lease. The distinction is further minimized in coal 
and lignite uses in current use since advance or minimum royalty is
-30-
framed as a special limitation or a covenant to function the same 
as the drilling clause in the oil and gas lease. Functional differ- 
ences between the respective leases have been further diminished by 
current coal and lignite leases uniformly adopting the indefinite 
secondary term of the oil and gas habendum clause. In effect, a
standard form "mineral lease" drafted to function like the familiar
oil and gas lease and applicable to fugacious as well as non-fuga- 
cious minerals, appears to be in evolution. The obvious result will 
be, to a great extent, an obliteration of the historical differences 
between the hard minerals lease and the oil and gas lease.
This is not to say, however, that extensive lignite development 
will occur without impact on Arkansas law. Important legal issues 
that may require resolution include the further delineation of what 
constitutes a grant of the right to strip mine in the deed of 
severance; the protection to be accorded to the owners of other 
minerals by a lignite lessee contemplating strip mining; the rights 
if any, of land owners adjoining tracts being strip mined; and the 
actual implementation of varying standards of reclamation. The 
natural resources bar now faces the challenge inherent in the com- 
merical development of a "new" energy resource that entails extensive 
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